Hastings Law Journal
Volume 45 | Issue 4

Article 1

1-1994

Introduction
Joseph R. Grodin

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Joseph R. Grodin, Introduction, 45 Hastings L.J. 707 (1994).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol45/iss4/1

This Introduction is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.

Articles
Introduction
JOSEPH

by
R. GRODIN*

Welcome everyone, on behalf of Hastings Law School. For those
of you who are from out of town, may I say that what we have outside
we do not call rain. That is fog and will no doubt disappear by the
afternoon.
I had a student some years ago who expressed an insight I still
remember. She said that it seemed to her that no matter what a husband and wife argue about, it always boils down to the same question:
Why can't you be more like me? The more I think about constitutional law and the sorts of debates that surround it the more it seems
to me they boil down to a single question: How do we explain and
justify judicial review in a democratic society? Or in mundane terms,
if we don't like Lochner,' but we like Roe v. Wade,2 what do we have
to say for ourselves?
In attempting to answer that question, we have developed by now
an extraordinarily rich vocabulary. We have rights that are fundamental and not so fundamental. We have public interests that are insubstantial, substantial, and compelling. We have classes that are suspect,
nonsuspect, and somewhat suspect. We have scrutiny that is strict, intermediate, and deferential. We have burdens that are insignificant,
significant, and undue. We have balancing that is ad hoe, categorical,
or a combination thereof. We have fits that are loose, close, and close
enough for government work-and sometimes we just have fits. In
short, ladies and gentlemen, we have doctrinal chaos.
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. B.A.,
University of California at Berkeley; J.D., Yale Law School; Ph.D., Labor Law and Labor
Relations, London School of Economics. Associate Justice, California Supreme Court,
1982-1987.

1. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
2.

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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Now, doctrinal chaos may be considered by some to be an inevitable, and perhaps not wholly undesirable, concomitant with the
world's and the law's inherent indeterminacy. But for those of us who
profess to teach a subject called constitutional law, for lawyers who
would attempt to advise clients and construct arguments, and for
judges who are in search of guidance-both about what they are supposed to be doing and about a language with which to explain what
they have done-the chaos is disconcerting. And, I might add, as I
see in the audience representatives of our California courts, that this
doctrinal confusion is a problem not only for federal judges and for
the federal constitution. In case you forget, state court judges are not
only in the federal constitutional business, but in the state constitutional business as well. Moreover, doctrine at the state level is, if anything, even less coherent.
I suspect you will not be shocked if I tell you that based on my
own experience and my knowledge of the experience of other judges I
have known, judges do not spend a lot of time reading constitutional
theory or for that matter thinking about it. But that is quite a different matter from saying that constitutional theory is unimportant to
what they do. Theory has a way of infiltrating perspectives, including
judges' perspectives. So this conference, which brings together surely
some of the most distinguished and talented constitutional scholars
ever to grace the podium and ever to focus upon the most fundamental problems concerning the judicial role, is a most heartening development. All of us in attendance are grateful to David Faigman, my
colleague, who is the principal inspiration for this conference; to the
editorial staff of the Hastings Law Journal (and particularly Catherine
Rogers, who spoke earlier, who has devoted enormous time to this
event); to the participants who have come from distant parts to allow
us to partake of their knowledge; and to all of you in the audience
who I hope will participate in the discussions.
The title of the conference comes, as I'm sure you recognize, from
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Bendix Autolite v. Midwesco En-

terprises.3 In Bendix, the good justice, with characteristic pithiness,
sought to demonstrate his low regard for the balancing metaphor. It is
a regard which I happen to share, but for quite different reasons. I
think the balancing metaphor, quite apart from the questions of commensurability that Justice Scalia raises, is a misleading metaphor if it is
intended to describe the actual decisional process, but I'm sure we will
3. See Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia,
J., concurring).
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hear more about that. Justice Scalia's critique is aimed at the incommensurability of the factors which are said to be weighed in the process and this morning's panels will focus on the balancing metaphor
and in part upon that question of incommensurability. This afternoon
the focus will shift to the problem of identifying and evaluating government or public interests that are asserted in justification.
Permit me then to introduce Professor Thomas Grey, who will
chair the first panel.

